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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brian Elliott Hogue appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for
the appointment of counsel, motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and motion for a hearing.
Mr. Hogue asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion
to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hogue pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft, felony, in violation of Idaho
Code§ 18-2407(1), and one count of issuing a check without funds, felony, in violation
of I.C. § 18-3106(a). (R., pp.11, 17; see generally No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012.) 1 The
district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with five years fixed, for the
grand theft count, and a concurrent fixed sentence of three years for the issuing a check
without funds count. (R., pp.12, 17.) Later, the district court denied Mr. Hague's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., pp.9-13, 17-19.) Mr. Hogue
then appealed the district court's sentencing decision, which the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed.

State v. Hogue, No. 40005, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 530 (Idaho

Ct. App. June 10, 2013).
Meanwhile, Mr. Hogue filed, pro se, a Notice of Pro Se Defendant. (R., pp.2021.)

In the notice, he asked the district court to appoint counsel to aid him in his

defense. (R., p.20.)
Mr. Hogue also filed, prose, a timely Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R., pp.2233.)

In the motion, Mr. Hogue asserted that his plea of guilty was not knowing or

The Idaho Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the record and transcript filed in
Mr. Hague's prior appeal, Supreme Court Docket No. 40005. (R., p.2.)

1

1

voluntary.

(R., pp.22-23.)

He asserted that his plea was not knowing or voluntary

because, while he was in custody at the Ada County Jail for fourteen months, he had
been routinely denied access to counsel, his legal documents and legal mail were
withheld from him, and his attorneys did not bring the denial of access to counsel or
withholding of legal documents to the attention of the district court, despite his requests
that they do so. (R., p.23.) Mr. Hogue had been placed on a "Behavior Modification
Plan" while he was at the Ada County Jail. (R., pp.23, 28.) In an email to Mr. Hague's
trial counsel, an officer at the jail stated that, "At this time, [Mr. Hogue] may not use the
telephone and does not have any writing materials or any of his personal property."
(R., pp.23, 28.) Mr. Hogue asserted that "[t]his was [meant] to impede [Mr. Hague's]
defense and violated his Constitutional rights under the Idaho State Constitution and the
United States Constitution." (R., pp.23-24.)

He also asserted that his attorneys had

rendered ineffective assistance, and that he had been prejudiced thereby, "[w]hen his
counsel [failed] to [either] correct the violation of [Mr. Hogue's] rights or to notify the
Court of the violation and seek relief." (R., p.24.)
Mr. Hogue further asserted that the timing of the behavior modification plan was
suspect, because the plan started at approximately the same time Mr. Hogue came
under investigation for possession of sexual exploitative materials in a separate case.
(R., pp.23-24;

see R., pp.12, 17.)2 The behavior modification plan "was used as an

[explanation] by Boise PD Detective Wade Spain as why [Mr.] Hogue could not be
served with notice of a search warrant" in the separate case. (R., p.24;

see R., pp.31-

32.)

2

In the separate case, Mr. Hogue eventually pleaded guilty to one count of possession
of sexually exploitative materials, in violation of I.C. § 18-1507(A). (R., p.23.)

2

Additionally, Mr. Hogue asserted that, given the "harsh treatment" he endured at
the Ada County Jail and his pre-existing mental health issues, "it is [extremely likely]
that [Mr. Hague's competency] at the time of his entry [of] plea may have been
diminished." (R., p.25.)
In sum, Mr. Hogue asserted that his "having been denied access to his
attorney . . . and legal mail for such a prolonged period of time makes his plea
impossible to be knowing or [voluntary]." (R., p.25.) "The fact that [Mr. Hague's] rights
were violated to such a degree and his counsel did nothing to correct the issue
[demonstrate Mr. Hague's counsel's] representation was ineffective and makes
[Mr. Hague's] plea of guilty not [voluntary] or knowing." (R., p.25.) Thus, Mr. Hogue
essentially requested that the district court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and
schedule a trial. (See R., p.26.) He also requested a hearing if the motion were denied
for any reason. (R., p.26.)
The district court later issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Motions to Appoint Counsel, Withdraw Guilty Plea, and Set a Hearing. 3 (R., pp.34-40.)
With respect to Mr. Hague's request for the appointment of counsel, the district court
explained that "[a] needy criminal defendant has a right to counsel at public expense at
all critical stages of the criminal process." (R., p.36.)

"A person is considered 'needy,'

for purposes of appointment of counsel at public expense, if he or she is unable to pay
for representation. I.C. § 19-851 (C). This determination usually requires an affidavit of
financial means." (R., p.36.) The district court then denied Mr. Hague's motion for the
appointment of counsel, after finding that he "has failed to submit any affidavit, sworn or

3

In the memorandum decision and order, the district court also denied Mr. Hague's pro

se Motion for Declaration of Mistrial/Dismissal (R., pp.41-43), because "the defendant
pied guilty as part of a plea bargain; no trial was held." (R., p.34.)

3

unsworn, to the effect that he is indigent," and that at one point he had hired private
counsel. (R., p.36.) Thus, "the Court lacks sufficient evidence from which to determine
whether [Mr. Hogue] is 'needy' as defined in i.C. § 19-851 (C)." (R., p.36.)
The district court then stated, "Even if [Mr. Hogue] were needy, the court could
still deny appointment of counsel if the motion 'is not a proceeding that a reasonable
person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is
therefore a frivolous proceeding."' (R., p.37 (quoting I.C. § 19-852(b)(3); State v. Wade,
125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994)).)

The district court determined that Mr. Hogue's

"arguments for allowing withdrawal of his plea are not such as would compel a
reasonable person of adequate means to bring at his own expense." (R., p.37.) The
district court rejected Mr. Hague's argument that he had been denied access to counsel
because he "failed to note even a single specific occasion upon which he asked to
speak to his attorney, and was prevented from doing so within a reasonable period of
time," and because "the jail notified his then-counsel ... that if he needed to speak with
his client, he would need to visit him at the jail, as [Mr. Hague's] access to telephones
and writing materials was restricted in accordance with the [behavior modification] plan."
(R., p.37; see R., p.27.)
That Mr. Hogue was not permitted access to a telephone or letterwriting materials for an unknown period upon demand in order to speak
with his counsel does not frame anything like a claim that he was denied
access to counsel, and a reasonable person would not finance such a
claim.
(R., pp.37-38.)
The district court also determined that "Mr. Hague's claim that he was denied
access to legal mail is not one that a reasonable person would finance with his own
money." (R., p.38.) "[Mr.] Hogue does not allege either that the officers failed to notify

4

him of the contents of the warrant [in the separate case], that he was prevented from
reading the warrant, or that jail personnel failed to provide him with the warrant copies
within a reasonable time after their delivery." (R., p.38.) The district court determined
that Mr. Hogue "apparently believes that his rights were violated because he was
prevented from taking immediate possession of [the warrant copies] when the officers
came to the jail," which could not be developed into a meritorious claim even with the
assistance of counsel. (R., p.38.)
Further, the district court determined that, while Mr. Hogue alleged ineffective
assistance by both of his attorneys, "[b]ecause the record supplied by Mr. Hogue on its
face shows quite clearly that the defendant did not suffer a violation of his rights as
claimed, no reasonable person would finance this claim with his or her money."
(R., p.38.) In sum, the district court denied Mr. Hague's motion for the appointment of

counsel. 4 (R., p.38.)
The district court also denied Mr. Hague's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
(R., pp.39-40.) Because Mr. Hogue filed the motion to withdraw his guilty plea after he

was sentenced, he had to show "manifest injustice" to withdraw the plea. {R., p.39.)

Later, the district court issued an amended memorandum decision and order.
(R., pp.136-43.) The district court amended the section denying the motion for the
appointment of counsel "to include a citation to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals
addressing the right to counsel in the context of a postjudgment motion to withdraw a
guilty plea." (R., p.136.) The district court cited State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 458
(Ct. App. 2010), where the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that "a post-judgment
hearing upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment." (R., p.138 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).)
Based on Hartshorn, the district court concluded that "while nothing prevents a criminal
defendant from requesting counsel at public expense to represent him in connection
with a with a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a trial court is not
Constitutionally bound to grant the motion even if the defendant is indigent." (R., p.138
(emphasis omitted).) The district court denied the motion for the appointment of
counsel, because "the Court determines that this is not a critical stage of the criminal
process." (R., p.139 (emphasis omitted).)
4
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The district court observed that "manifest injustice" is shown where the plea was not
knowing or voluntary. (See R., p.39.) According to the district court, Mr. Hogue failed to
explain how the restrictions imposed by the behavior modification plan, or the fact that
he did not immediately receive the warrant copies, "undermined the validity of his plea."
(R., p.39.) The district court stated that Mr. Hogue did not provide any specific facts or
evidence in support of his claims that he received harsh treatment or that his preexisting mental health issues made it extremely likely that his mental competency may
have been diminished. (R., pp.39-40.) "In short, because [Mr. Hogue] has not framed
even a colorable argument as to his claim that his plea was not given knowingly or
voluntarily, the Court concludes that no manifest injustice has been shown or would
result if the defendant were not permitted to withdraw his plea." (R., p.40.)
Additionally, the district court denied Mr. Hogue's request for a hearing "because
he has failed to present any claim which might be developed at such a hearing into one
entitling him to the relief sought." (R., p.40.)
Mr. Hogue then filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motions to Appoint Counsel, Withdraw
Guilty Plea, and Set a Hearing. 5 (R., pp.49-53.)

Mr. Hogue subsequently filed a Renewed Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R., pp.7273.) He also filed an affidavit and memorandum of law in support of the renewed
motion. (R., pp.74-88.) The district court issued an order staying the renewed motion
"pending the outcome of [Mr. Hogue's] direct appeal." (R., p.144.) Mr. Hogue then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Staying Proceedings. (R., pp.148-51.)
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration after finding the motion to be
"utterly frivolous," and warned that "[a]ny further frivolous filings from Mr. Hogue will risk
the imposition of sanctions." (R., pp.206-07.)
5

6

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hague's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hogue's Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Mr. Hogue asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because he has shown that manifest injustice
necessary to withdraw the plea existed. An appellate court reviews a district court's
decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hayes,
138 Idaho 761, 765 (Ct. App. 2003).
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant
to withdraw defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The rule requires a more rigorous measure
of proof for post-sentence motions. See State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 571 (2011 ).
"A showing of manifest injustice is necessary in order to withdraw a guilty plea after
sentencing." Id.
"Because a guilty plea by a criminal defendant waives certain constitutional
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the
right of confrontation, a guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record demonstrates
that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Heredia,
144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007).

"Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver is not met." Id.
A court determines whether a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly through a
three-part inquiry involving:
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
8

confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself;
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of
pleading guilty.
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993).

"On appeal, Idaho law requires that

voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record
as a whole." Id.
Mr. Hogue asserts that he has shown that manifest injustice necessary to
withdraw the plea existed because his plea was not knowing or voluntary. His plea was
not knowing or voluntary because he did not understand the consequences of pleading
guilty. At the entry of plea hearing, pursuant to the plea agreement, the State requested
that the sentence in this case would run concurrently to the sentence in the pending
separate case involving possession of sexually exploitative materials.

(No. 40005

Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.10-20.) That request was part of a "global resolution" for both
cases. (See No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.13-16.) The separate case was still
at the preliminary hearing stage. (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.13-14.) After
the State explained the terms of the plea agreement, when the district court asked
Mr. Hague's counsel whether that was also his understanding of the plea agreement, he
replied, "It is, Your Honor." (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.4, Ls.9-11.) The district
court then accepted Mr. Hague's guilty pleas in this case.

(No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27,

2012, p.22, Ls.4-13.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court went over the terms of the plea
agreement, including that Mr. Hague's "sentences were to be made concurrent to" the
sentence in the separate case. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.19.)
The State notified the district court that it would stand by the plea agreement in this
case even though Mr. Hogue had subsequently pleaded not guilty in the separate case:
9

Quite frankly, given that this was a global offer, Mr. Hogue did plead not
guilty in the other case, we do believe we would have grounds to withdraw
from that plea agreement and ask for more, if we so desired. However, I
articulated that I was going to withdraw from that plea agreement and ask
for more, if we so desired. However, I articulated that I was going to go
ahead and follow that plea agreement anyway, not withdraw from it,
because I believe-I believed, at the time, that it was the appropriate
resolution of this case and, quite frankly, I still do.
(No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.14, L.22-p.15, L.12.)
After the district court heard argument from counsel and comments from
Mr. Hogue, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. I cannot order my sentence to be consecutive to a
sentence that has not been imposed yet. I just want both parties to know
that. I will put in the order, pursuant to the agreement between the
parties, that the Court has no objection to it being made consecutive oror-or pardon me-concurrent, but that will be up to whoever imposes
sentence in that case, should the defendant be found guilty.
[THE PROSECUTOR:] And, Your Honor, I believe the parties did
understand that at the time Mr. Hogue entered into his guilty plea in this
case. The child porn case [(the separate case)] was still at the preliminary
hearing whenTHE COURT: Okay.
[THE PROSECUTOR:] -that was added in as a term.
THE COURT: All right.
[THE PROSECUTOR:] Just toTHE COURT: I just wanted to be sure that that's clear on the record
because of the Supreme Court's ruling you can't do that, you can't make
something concurrent or consecutive to a sentence that has not yet
been imposed.
(No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.29, L.11 - p.30, L.6.) The district court then imposed
sentence. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.30, Ls.7-20.) "The Court has no objection to
these sentences being concurrent with the sentence imposed in [the separate case], but
that must be determined by the Judge in that case." (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.30,
10

Ls.21-24.)

In the separate case, the district court imposed a sentence of six years

indeterminate, to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in this case. (No. 40273
Tr., Aug. 15, 2012, p.23, Ls.6-15.)
"Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings,
including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show ... [t]he defendant was
informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum
punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply."

I.C.R. 11 (c)(2).

A

district court may not order that a defendant's sentences in two cases run concurrently,
if the defendant has not yet been convicted in one of those cases. See I.C. § 18-308.
Mr. Hogue submits that, because the district court accepted his guilty pleas
without telling Mr. Hogue that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this
case and the separate case run concurrently, he was not "informed of the
consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other
direct consequences which may apply." See I.C.R. 11 (c)(2). The district court did not
tell Mr. Hogue that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this case and
the separate case run concurrently. As discussed above, at the entry of plea hearing
the State asked for the sentence in this case to run concurrently to the sentence in the
pending separate case. (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.2, Ls.10-20.) That was also
Mr. Hague's counsel's understanding of the plea agreement.
Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.4, Ls.9-11.)

(See No. 40005

Indeed, at the sentencing hearing the district court

initially told Mr. Hogue that, as part of the plea agreement, "Your sentences were to be
made concurrent" to the sentence in the separate case. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012,
p.6, Ls.14-15.)

Thus, the district court never told Mr. Hogue that it did not have

11

authority to order that the sentences in this case and the separate case run
concurrently.
During the sentencing hearing the State alleged that, at the time Mr. Hogue
pleaded guilty in this case, the parties understood that the district court did not have
authority to order that the sentences in this case and the separate case run
concurrently. (No. 40005 Tr., May 8, 2012, p.29, Ls.19-22.) However, the record belies
this allegation. Nothing in the transcript of the entry of plea hearing indicates that the
parties, to say nothing of Mr. Hogue, understood that the district court did not have
authority to order that the sentences in this case and the separate case run
concurrently. The State requested that the sentence in this case "run concurrent to [the
separate case] that Mr. Hogue has currently pending." (No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012,
p.2, Ls.10-13.) The State made a direct request for this, and did not couch its request in
terms of asking the district court to have no objection to the sentence in this case
running concurrently. Additionally, Mr. Hague's counsel told the district court that that
was also his understanding of the plea agreement. (See No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012,
p.4, Ls.9-11.) Further, when the district court accepted Mr. Hague's guilty pleas, it did
not inform Mr. Hogue that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this
case and the separate case run concurrently. (See No. 40005 Tr., Jan. 27, 2012, p.22,
Ls.4-14.)

Thus, nothing on the record indicates that the parties understood that the

district court did not have authority to order that the sentences in this case and the
separate case run concurrently.
Because the district court accepted Mr. Hague's guilty pleas without telling the
parties that it did not have authority to order that the sentences in this case and the
separate case run concurrently, Mr. Hogue was not informed of the consequences of
12

the plea. Thus, Mr. Hague's plea was not knowing or voluntary because he did not
understand the consequences of pleading guilty.

See Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484.

Because Mr. Hague's plea was not knowing or voluntary, he has shown that manifest
injustice necessary to withdraw his plea after sentencing existed.
Idaho at 571.

See Flowers, 150

The district court therefore abused its discretion when it denied

Mr. Hague's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

See Hayes, 138 Idaho at 765.

Mr. Hague's judgment of conviction should be vacated and his case should be
remanded with direction to permit him to withdraw his plea of guilty.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Hogue respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and remand the case with direction to permit him to withdraw his
plea of guilty.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2013.

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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